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The University in a Pluralistic Society
Marc D. Guerra, Assumption College
John Courtney Murray, S.J., was not the first 20th century thinker to
observe that the modern university contributes to the erosion of those
social and political institutions that have traditionally helped sustain
American democracy. Similar claims were made earlier in the century by Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, and Russell Kirk. As the unprecedented and unexpected success of Allan Bloom's Closing of the
American Mind (and, to a lesser degree, E. D. Hirsch's Cultural
Literacy) later showed, voicing such concerns became something of a
cottage industry by the century's end. However, what sets Murray's
argument apart from these others is that he approaches this problem
from the perspective of America's democratic experience with religious pluralism and the effects this has had on the health and sustainability of what Murray called the "American Proposition."
By institutionalizing the practice of religious pluralism, American
democracy formed something of an intellectual and political paradox. The existence of religious pluralism draws attention to the various disagreements religious Americans have about "the nature and
destiny of man within a universe that stands under the reign of
God." 1 Yet these substantive disagreements come to sight within a
civil society that is itself bound together by a "public consensus"
about the nature of human beings and human freedom. That the
question of the theoretical grounds of the practice of religious pluralism admits of no easy and readymade solution undoubtedly explains
"why it is so seldom asked" in our contemporary universities,
according to Murray.2
Murray goes out of his way to make clear that the university,
even within a democratic society, does not exist for the sake of maintaining a healthy, pluralist civil society. While having discernible
moral and political implications, the university's goal transcends the
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legitimate but limited concerns of political life. Most fundamentally,
the university qua university "is committed to the task of putting an
end to prejudice based on ignorance. " 3 It is that "social institution
whose function it is to bring the resources of reason and intelligence
to bear, through all the disciplines of learning and teaching, on the
problems of truth and understanding that confront society because
they confront the mind of man himself. " 4 To be sure, the university
is limited in its ability to achieve its lofty goals. Its end is "not at all
messianic." 5 But when called upon to justify its place within civil
society, the university can respond that it indirectly aids the political
order by banishing, "as far as it can," false prejudices about the true
nature and end of human life. 6 In so doing, it becomes an ally and
defender of genuine freedom. To the extent it helps replace unfounded opinion with knowledge of the truth, the university occupies a
privileged place in American society, a place where citizens, individually and collectively, enjoy the "freedom to learn - to explore" what
it means to be a human being.7 In this politically high-minded way
the university fulfills an indirect but indispensable role in American
democracy.
Theoretically, the modern university and the problem of pluralism convergence on the same question: "What is man?" 8 Not coincidentally, this is also modernity's essential question. It is the question
from which "all others proliferate" and to which eventually "all
return" in modernity9 But it cannot be framed in narrowly anthropocentric terms. To understand who and what man is, one has to
wonder about his place in the universe. Such a line of inquiry requires
one to engage the most serious and authoritative claims about human
beings and the whole, including, paradoxically, the "skeptic or agnostic view" that asserts it is "useless or illegitimate even to ask Ultimate
Questions." 10 For this reason, the university is obliged to examine the
responses revealed religions give to this question. They too claim to
have an answer to the question about man. In fact, they claim to have
the definitive answer to this "basic" question. If the university is to
take its purpose seriously, it eventually finds itself caught up in "the
characteristically modern situation of religious conflict" - albeit a
conflict formed not by outward religious or civil strife but by the kind
of rigorous intellectual debate that ought to define the life of the uni}370{
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To flee from this situation would constitute "a flight from
reality," an unfounded and willful attempt to deny the university's
"spiritual and intellectual situation" in the modern pluralistic world
·.in which it finds itself. 12
At this point, some of the political implications Murray attributes
· to the university begin to come into focus. For the public consensus
that lies at the heart of the American Proposition claims to be based
, on a true account of the nature of man and a just and decent civil
society. 13 In Murray's view, that consensus can be truthfully main. tained only by recourse to a "theory of natural law" that offers "an
. account of the public moral experience" embodied in the American
Proposition. 14 Affirming the moral and intellectual legitimacy of the
basic equality of all men, the right to religious freedom, the belief that
government must respect the consent of the governed, and the claim
men are endowed by the Creator with rights that limit the just exer. cise of popular sovereignty, the natural law theory that undergirds the
American Proposition presupposes - and as Murray admits, stands or
falls on - a coherent and valid "realist epistemology." 15 Putting such
an epistemology to the test, Murray insists, ought to be a regular
activity in the intellectual and spiritual life of the modern American
university.
Murray famously argued that the intellectual affirmation of natural law theory and its corresponding realist epistemology form part
of America's (and more broadly Western civilization's) classical and
Christian "patrimony. " 16 That patrimony cannot be sustained by
pietistic veneration of this inheritance simply because it is our own.
Nor should it be. There are many things we inherit - customs, prejudices, old cars - whose veneration and transmission may not be justified in the bright light of day. Whether the natural law theory and
epistemology operative in the American Proposition deserves to be
sustained rests on whether the claims they make "are true. " 17 Murray
believes they are, whether the Founders fully recognized this fact or
not. Providentially, "the American political community was organized in an era when the tradition of natural law and natural rights
was still vigorous." 18 That tradition was invoked to bring a new and
unprecedented kind of political order into existence. Its acceptance
therefore could not have depended on the pious veneration of a
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JERUSALEM, ATHENS, AND ROME

preexisting civic order. Quite the contrary, it had to elicit the assent
of "free minds. " 19
Murray forthrightly acknowledges that the stability of America's
public consensus has been imperiled from the country's beginning. In
their writings, the Founders oscillated between rooting the American
Proposition in two outwardly similar but inwardly dissimilar notions
of natural law. According to Murray, one of these conceptions
worked within a natural law tradition that originated in the works of
classical philosophy, blossomed in the writings of St. Thomas
Aquinas, and eventually became woven into the "Western classical
and Christian tradition." But in their more rationalistic, i.e., more
Lockean, formulations, Founders such as Jefferson routinely
obscured human freedom's constitutive relation to "transcendent
truth." Appealing to theories that claimed that human beings originally existed autonomously in a premoral and prepolitical state of
nature, such formulations invoked a "philosophically shallow" law
of nature. 20 The coexistence of these dueling theoretical notions of
natural law reveals a fundamental tension at the heart of the
American Founding between a "voluntarist idea of law as will" and
a "tradition of natural law as inheritance . . . an intellectualist
idea. " 21 The problem of radical autonomy or liberty severed from
any end, Murray insists, is not a late edition to or innovation in
America's democratic life. It was a "possibility ... inherent from the
beginning." 22
Murray was not the first Catholic thinker to recognize this theoretical tension at the heart of the American Founding. That point had
been made in the nineteenth century by the Catholic political thinker
Orestes Brownson. Brownson called attention to the dissimilarities
between the moral and political demands of what he called America's
providential constitution and those he identified with the Jeffersonian
idea of democracy. In The American Republic (1866), he argued that
America like every nation is endowed with a particular providential
constitution. Such a constitution exists prior to and is more fundamental than any written constitution; it shapes and informs the life of
the American people. "The constitution of the state, or the people of
the state, is, in its origin at least, providential, given by God himself,
operating through historical events or natural causes. " 23 Working
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within the parameters set by human nature and the moral, social, and
intellectual history the American people hold in common, this constitution binds citizens together and limits what is possible for citizens
and statesmen within American political life. Brownson contrasted
this view of American democracy with those of the "so-called
Jeffersonian democracy. " 24 Emphasizing the sovereignty of the individual, this view claims that "government has no powers but such as
it derives from the consent of the governed." 25 Taken on its own
terms and drawn to its logical conclusion, Jeffersonian democracy,
according to Brownson, culminates in "pure individualism - philosophically considered, pure egoism, which says, 'I am God."' 26
Moreover, two years before Murray published We Hold These
Truths, Raymond-Leopold Bruckberger, O.P., made similar observations in his Images of America (1958). Bruckberger noted the profound differences between Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of
Independence and the final version of that document as voted by
Congress. In his view, there was "no doubt ... that Congress and
Jefferson had different concepts of God. " 27 Jefferson's famed reference to "Nature's God," Bruckberger observes, "did not commit him
to much." 28 It deliberately remained "as vaguely defined as possible."29 In particular, Jefferson carefully steered clear of any reference
to God "as personal and distinct from nature; as Creator, Providence,
and Judge." 30 By contrast, the majority of the members of Congress
remained in the intellectual "tradition of the first New England
Puritans." 31 They were men who "had read the Bible and ... believed
in it." 32 The irreducible theoretical differences between Jefferson's
and Congress's understandings of God, Bruckberger maintains,
nonetheless had positive political effects on the American regime:
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The greatest luck of all for the Declaration was precisely the
divergence and the comprise between the puritan tradition
and what Jefferson wrote. Had the Declaration been written
in the strictly Puritan tradition it would probably not have
managed to avoid an aftertaste of theocracy and religious
fanaticism. Had it been written from the standpoint of the lax
philosophy of the day, it would have been a-religious, if not
actually offensive to Christians. 33
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While Brownson and Bruckberger traced Jefferson's libertarian
natural rights teaching back to the writings of early modern political
philosophers, Murray traces it back to the nominalism propounded
by late medieval thinkers such as Duns Scotus and William of
Ockham. There are reasons to question the adequacy of Murray's
genealogical analysis, however. It is less than clear that early modern
philosophers like Machiavelli, Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza,
and Locke were unwittingly or blindly drawing out the practical
implications of the nominalist conceptions of reason they inherited
from the decadent scholasticism of the late medieval period. Their
writings suggest otherwise. Machiavelli's critique of imaginary
republics, Descartes' criticism of the sandcastles ancient moral philosophy erected, and Spinoza's disparagement of classical Utopias show
that these thinkers self-consciously saw themselves as rejecting the
forms of rationalism and republicanism that had informed the classical philosophic and Christian theological traditions and embracing
new theoretical, empirical, and practical conceptions of reason that
were, in their words, far less risky and utopian than their premodern
counterparts.
Be that as it may, Murray is right to note that the countervailing
intellectualist notion of natural law that originally helped keep the
Lockean idea of man as an autonomous individual in check has today
fallen into disrepute. Our problem is not simply that the voluntaristic view of natural law has gained moral and political legitimacy. It
runs deeper. The belief that there are universal truths about man and
morality that human reason can know is now routinely called into
question. 34 Accordingly, we "face a crisis that is new in history. "35 At
its core, this crisis stems from late modern rationalism's denial of any
metaphysical or transhistorical principles that could help men make
sense of their current situation. When translated into the language of
political life, the denial of these principles eviscerates the moral and
political claims embodied in the American Proposition in "one
stroke." 36 At the time of the American Founding, the truth of the
Declaration's self-evident claims was thought to be able to win the
day once "subjected to the unbridled competition of the market place
of ideas." In late modernity, "it is no longer possible to cherish this
naivete. " 37
}374{
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That contemporary intellectuals no longer share the
Enlightenment's faith in reason's unbridled explanatory powers, in
Murray's judgment, reveals that we have in the decisive respect
- "reached the end of the era that it gave itself the qualification 'mod38 As such, we have entered a "post-modern" era.
1 ern."'
Postmodernism's morally, intellectually, and spiritually "debilitating" doctrine is now the dominant view in America's universities.
The university both suffers from and contributes to late modern
man's experience of "disenchantment. " 39 Dogmatically committed
to academically fashionable doctrines, our universities wittingly and
unwittingly contribute to the "decay of political intelligence" and to
the "loss of confidence in the power of reason to fix the purposes of
political life and to direct the energies of freedom in such a way as
to impose a due measure of human control upon the forces of history."40
Murray is quick to point out that the nihilistic and relativistic
doctrines students are likely to be indoctrinated with are not propounded by philosophers, or even sophists who pose as philosophers.
They are disseminated by what Murray refers to in his short book
The Problem of God as "the godless man of the Theatre." 41 The
appearance of this "Post-modern" type is something new. 42 The godless man of the Theatre is not so much genuinely post-modern but
hyper-modern. Like his early modern predecessors, he desires to
exorcise any residual faith that human beings may have in what
Hobbes characterized as powers unseen. But unlike his early modern
predecessors, he does not believe that reason is (or ever could be) our
true star and compass. For him, the claim that reason can know the
truth about man and the universe is one of the ghosts that must be
exorcised from late modern man's consciousness. In this respect, the
godless man of the Theatre exhibits "continuity amid difference. " 43
As his title suggests, the godless man of the Theatre is essentially an
"actor." In sharp contrast to the classical philosophers, and to a lesser extent the early modern philosophers, he is not moved by philosophy. In fact, he denies that eras can be directed towards a love of wisdom. Caring "nothing for metaphysics or epistemology, " 44 he views
himself as a phenomenologist, artfully and entertainingly describing
"the situation" of man. That situation is marked by the claim that
}375{
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man has no nature. He has only a presence, "an actual 'being-therein-the-moment' in action and freedom. " 45 The godless man of the
Theater acknowledges only the presenting "fact." One imagines that
to such a man Google comes as close as one can to a god: Ask Google
a question and it renders the sterile, free-standing answer right before
your eyes.
Given the self-imposed strictures he places on his descriptive
powers, when speaking to other human beings the godless man of the
Theatre is prone to appeal to "the public imagination, common
impressions, generally shared feelings about things. " 46 He uses these
emotional appeals as vehicles for his own ideas. 47 Both playwright
and actor, he performs in a project of his own creation in the hope
that this will allow him to exist undisturbed in a world he believes is
absurd. Any other life, he asserts, is destined to be crippled by a sense
of "anguish and anxiety. " 48 The godless man of the Theatre does not
desire to exercise overt rule over his fellow human beings - in this,
according to Murray, he differs markedly from the "godless man of
the communist world revolution." But he does seek to exercise indirect rule over his fellow human beings insofar as he wishes to abreast
them of the utterly chaotic nature of human life and the universe. His
form of rule accordingly provides a model, not the model, for other
human beings.
As Murray presents him, the godless man of the Theatre ultimately sets forth two lessons: 1) the alleged pluripotent character of
human existence and, 2) the alleged independence of human freedom
from any external and transcendent limit and restraint. 49 He preaches that each man can, and must, become the '"inventor of himself' (in
Sartre's phrase)." 50 Only through the act of self-creation can one
become a free and unique "individual." 51 Such a radical act unmasks
the true power of man and the futility of believing that human beings
can hold social and political life in common. Whereas political life
requires citizens to recognize both their interconnection and dependence on each other, being an individual demands that one assumes
"single and full obligation" for his own existence. The self-creating
individual makes a fundamental and "original choice to be-for-himself." Disavowing any connection or indebtedness to any other
human being, he bears "the entire responsibility" for himself and his
}376{

t
2

(
t

The University in a Pluralistic Society

iere. the
that
ogle
fore

non
1ese
ight
ope
~s is
~nse

not
his,
i of
idi~ast

His
her

lti. of
om
ch(in
me
iks
igs
ife
idies
ng
m-

Ler
HS

world. 52 Rejecting all metaphysical and teleological claims, the godless man of the Theatre radicalizes the problem of religious pluralism
by asserting that each human being is and ought to be his own
Creator-God.
Against this backdrop, Murray proposes that our universities
reclaim something of their natural purpose by subjecting the claims
the Western revealed religions make about human beings, the universe, and God to serious, academic examination. Murray does not
propose that the modern university assume the implausible role the
Republic ironically assigns to the philosopher-king. The university,
like the professors and students that populate it, is constitutionally
incapable of demonstrating the truth of a revealed religion, let alone
ordering civil society around such a demonstration. 53 It therefore
must resist the temptation to "reduce modern pluralism to unity." 54
But it can and should seek to elucidate the claims about the nature
and end of human life that revealed religions make. And it should be
able to say something about how reasonable these claims actually
are.
One of the striking features of Murray's proposal is that it suggests that this kind of investigation should begin by reflecting on the
content and demands of natural law and not by engaging in unmistakably metaphysical or theological reflections. But as Murray makes
clear, serious natural law reflections are neither narrowly moral and
political nor constrictively positivistic or reductionistic. Rather, eventually they require one to "opt . . . for a metaphysic of right." 55
Whether deliberate or not, Murray's argument at times exaggerates
what natural law reflections actually allow us to know about the
nature of man and the moral universe. Illustrative of this tendency is
his under-qualified remark that through the natural law our "intelligence" is capable of discovering the true "nature of things." 56
Murray remains on safer theoretical grounds when claiming that
natural law theory requires the affirmation of a God "Who is eternal
reason, Nous, ... [and] the summit of the order of being. " 57 Absent
the recognition of that God, natural law theory is in the end untenable. 58 Contrary to a number of 20th century Catholic and nonCatholic proponents of natural law theory, Murray rejects the claim
that one can deny the existence of God and still maintain that
}377{
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natural law coherently articulates the natural ends to which human
freedom is ordered. Taken on its own terms and drawn to its logic
conclusion, such a denial would require us to claim along with Kant
that nature and human freedom are permanently at odds with each
other, or to say that physical or biological necessity mechanistically
governs most (maybe even all) of embodied human life. Murray thus
rejects those arguments that claim that natural law theory is inherently biological and reductionist. In his judgment, they perpetuate "a
particularly gross and gratuitous misrepresentation, since nothing is
clearer in natural-law theory than its identification of the 'natural'
with the 'rational,' or perhaps better, the 'human.' Its whole effort is
to incorporate the biological values in man, notably his sexual tendencies, into the fuller human order of reason, and to deny them the
status of the primordial. The primordial in man - that which is first
in order - is his rational soul ... which informs all that is biological
in him. " 59 To affirm the existence of natural law is to affirm that
human freedom is ennobling precisely because it is freedom under
God. To think otherwise, Murray concludes, is itself unreasonable.
In making this claim, Murray sides with natural law theorists
such as Yves Simon over and against new-fangled natural law
thinkers like John Finnis and Germain Grisez. 60 In a way analogous
to Murray, Simon emphasized the connection between the existence
of God and the knowledge of morality man gains through the natural law. Simon affirmed a connection between the knowledge of
morality human beings gain through the natural law and the kind of
metaphysical knowledge of a God that renders all of reality, including moral reality, intelligible. Human beings' knowledge of the natural law provides them access to incomplete but authentic knowledge
about the eternal law and, ultimately, about its author, God; to affirm
that a particular moral or political arrangement is just or unjust
inevitably requires one to appeal to a metaphysical and theocentric
order that can support such a claim. On this point, Murray fundamentally agrees with Simon's claim that "the understanding of natural law can be logically preserved" without acknowledging God as
"the ultimate foundation of all laws. "6 1
Because revealed religions give substantively different accounts of
the nature and purpose of human freedom, they provide the natural
}378{
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law theorist with an opportunity to reflect upon the concrete implications these differences have on the problem of religious pluralism.
Who and what does Judaism claim man is? What is the end or ends
of human life, according to Catholicism? What is human freedom
grounded in according to Protestantism and what does Reformed
Christianity say proximately and remotely informs this freedom? In
the final analysis, these questions point well beyond the parameters
of even the most robust and expansive theory of natural law. But they
are questions whose initial terms and categories - Is man like every
other animal? Is he ordered to some form of transcendence? Is the
end of human freedom capable of being grasped by the natural light
of reason and, if so to, what degree? - are not wholly foreign to natural law theory. In this respect, Murray argues, natural law theory
shares with Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism the "reasonable
belief" that human beings are finite beings intrinsically ordered and
extrinsically guided to a truth not of their making.
The natural law theorist's reflections on the problem of religious
pluralism reveal a limited but important truth about the nature of
human beings and human freedom. While incapable of judging which
religion is the true religion, they can show how the moral teachings
of various revealed religions comport to what reason naturally knows
about the demands of justice and the natural virtue of religion.
Contrary to the claims of radical libertarianism, such knowledge
reminds democratic citizens that freedom, including the freedom to
choose one's religion, is constitutionally incapable of being an end in
itself. It points to the fact that freedom is a qualified good that necessarily needs to be tethered to a transcendent order of truth if it is to
be coherently defended. Practiced in this way, natural law investigations "could make some contribution to ... the reduction of modern
pluralism to intelligibility. " 62 For this reason, Murray argues, they
could help secular and religious universities form true citizens of the
academy and indirectly help form citizens fitted for a country that is
marked by its long experience of religious pluralism.
It must be noted that two formidable obstacles to Murray's proposal have arisen since the time he framed his argument about the
role of the university in a pluralist society. The first concerns the caliber of academic theological dispute that is capable of occurring in
}379{
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contemporary American universities. Murray's proposal presupposes
the availability of a substantial number of professors within the university who have "an understanding of the nature of religious
faith. " 63 At a minimum, such professors must possess knowledge of
their faith's doctrinal claims. But they must also know (and be able
to explain) what their faith means when it affirms that a given doctrine is true. To illustrate his point, Murray calls attention to the
"radical disagreement" that has historically existed between
Catholicism and Protestantism on the precise nature of theological
doctrine. For in systematically expressing its doctrinal claims,
Catholic theology traditionally stresses the harmony between faith
and reason and hence the reasonable character of doctrinal formulations far more than its Protestant counterpart.
But as Pope John Paul II emphasized in his encyclical letter Fides
et Ratio and Pope Benedict XVI stressed in his Regensburg lecture
"Faith, Reason, and University," today the theoretical principles
behind such traditional Catholic and Protestant theological disagreements are apt to go unnoticed. Working within modern science's and
modern philosophy's reductionistic accounts of the scope of human
reason, Catholic academics routinely deemphasize the reasonable
character of their faith. In our dehellenized age, an increasing number of Catholic academic theologians - ranging from those who
advocate theological eclecticism to some of those who advocate a
return to "radical orthodoxy" - present theology not as a speculative
science but as a form of postmodern fideism. In their writings, postmodern theory is portrayed not so much as a form of irrationalism
that undercuts the distinctive claim to reason Catholicism traditionally makes, but as a doctrine that offers the religion a new sense of
legitimacy in a world in which every claim to truth is said to rest on
a faith-filled commitment. Murray's proposal proved to be far too
optimistic, if not somewhat naive. At the very least, it seriously misjudged the majority of Catholic academicians' ability to protect
themselves from the intellectual deformations that typically plague
the late modern mind.
The other obstacle concerns the further disrepute natural law
theory has fallen into since Murray wrote We Hold These Truths.
Murray knew that in 1960 natural law theory was most likely to
}380{
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find a home in outposts within America's Catholic community.
These outposts have only grown smaller in the intervening years. To
be sure, over the past several decades an increasing number of
Catholic thinkers have found support for natural law arguments in
Pope John Paul II's 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor. But the natural law theory presented there reflects John Paul's own mixture of
natural law theory and phenomenological personalism more than it
does the kind of natural law theory that Murray strenuously advocated - or, for that matter, the natural law teaching Aquinas sets
forth in his Summa Theologiae·. And as we have already noted, contemporary Catholic jurists and analytic theorists like Finnis and
Grisez typically invoke natural law theories that have been trimmed
of explicit metaphysical and teleological claims in the hope that such
pruning will somehow make their theories more acceptable to the
late modern mind.
To be fair, the possible emergence of such obstacles was not wholly unforeseen by Murray. For example, he admitted that while the
contemporary "Protestant charcoal burner ... knows well enough
that he differs from the Catholic charcoal burner, and vice versa ...
it is not so certain that either of them could say why, in any articulate fashion. " 64 What is more, Murray did not think that the existence of these obstacles was entirely lamentable. He wittily remarked
that over the years the theory of natural law has been pronounced
dead only later to come back to life more times than one can count .
Part of the reason for this is that while natural law theory allows us
to discover something true about morality, human freedom, and ourselves this discovery needs to be articulated in a way that does justice
to the nature of these things. Among other things, such a task
requires us to have recourse to language that can truthfully explain
how morality helps shape and inform human freedom and our ability to live a genuinely dignified human life. Developing this language
(both inside and outside of our universities) in light of all that we can
really know about the nature of nature, morality, human freedom,
and the cosmos would undoubtedly help us bring about the latest
installment in the eternal return of the natural law. And for this
opportunity, Murray reminds us, the self-governing citizens of
American democracy should be grateful.
}381{
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